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By Andrew J. Filardo
T
he Federal Reserve has made significant
progress toward price stability over the
last two decades. The annual inflation
rate has declined from 13 percent in the early
1980s to roughly 2 percent today. The current
environmentoflowandstableinflationhasfos-
tered superior economic performance. Lower
inflationhasledtolowerinterestrates,whichin
turn have helped spur investment, foster more
affordable housing, and, arguably, support the
current solid expansion and strength of the
stock market.
To be sure, the current low-inflation environ-
menthascomeataprice.Onekeycostofachiev-
inglowinflationistheoutputlossthatgenerally
accompanies a permanent decline in inflation.




recession, though somewhat milder, also
accompaniedthedisinflationoftheearly1990s.
Another more subtle output cost of fighting
inflation is the cost of preventing inflation from
rising. As incipient inflation pressures build,
tighter monetary policy can slow the economy
and thereby preemptively forestall the rise in
actualinflation.Thesloweroutputgrowthisthe
cost of resisting inflation pressures. Together,
these two output costs of fighting inflation play
important roles in determining how to seek fur-
ther disinflation toward price stability and how
best to maintain low inflation.
1
A significant factor determining the output
costoffightinginflationisthetradeoffbetween
inflationandoutput,oftenreferredtoasthePhil-




of the business cycle, the speed of the disinfla-
tion, and how aggressively incipient inflation
pressuresarefought.Recentresearch,however,





curve and the associated output cost of fighting
inflation. The first section discusses how the
output cost of inflation is linked to the shape of
thePhillipscurveandreviewsthecurrentdebate
about the shape. The second section offers new
empiricalevidenceonthenonlinearshapeofthe
Phillips curve and on the output cost of fighting
inflation. The third section draws policy implica-
tionsfromthenewevidence.Thearticleconcludes
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accessed on the banks Website at www.kc.frb.org.that,whilethePhillipscurvetraditionallyhasbeen
thoughtofasapproximatelylinear,closerexamina-
tion of the inflation-output relationship reveals
importantnonlinearities.Thisnewevidenceand
its implications for the output cost of fighting
inflation may require new policy strategies.
I. RECENT CHALLENGE TO THE
TRADITIONAL VIEW OF THE
OUTPUT COST OF FIGHTING
INFLATION
Strategies for fighting inflation depend on
carefulconsiderationofallthecostsandbenefits





and maintaining low inflation include lost out-
put, higher unemployment, and related social
ills. This article focuses on the output cost of
fighting inflation by examining how to accu-
rately measure the output losses. Only with
accurate measures can the net benefits of fight-
ing inflation reliably be assessed.
2
Traditionally,theoutputcostoffightinginfla-
tion has been summarized in a single number
usingthesacrificeratioconcept.Thesacrifice
ratioisawell-knowneconomicconceptthatcan
distill complex economic phenomena into a
fairly simple, yet informative, cost measure.
Proposed by Okun in 1978, it exploits informa-
tion about output and inflation in the Phillips
curvetomeasurehowmuchoutputwouldbelost










The accompanying box reviews the traditional
linear Phillips curve framework and discusses
how it can be used to assess the output cost of
fighting inflation.
Estimates of the sacrifice ratio
Okun was interested in estimating the output
costofdisinflationandofferedasimplemethod
to measure the sacrifice ratio.
4 Using a back-
of-the-envelope approach based on the esti-
matedPhillipscurveslopesintheliteratureatthe
time, Okun reported a sacrifice ratio of 10.
5 In
other words, a permanent one-percentage-point
reduction in the inflation rate would, over time,
beassociatedwitha10percentreductioninreal
GDPahugeoutputcost.Toputthisnumberin
perspective, the 10 percent loss is equivalent to
the typical decline in GDPin a moderate reces-
sion.
6Figure 1 shows one possible time path of
output and inflation in response to a tighter
monetarypolicythatultimatelylowersinflation
by one percentage point. Okuns notion of the
sacrifice ratio corresponds to the output loss in
theshadedareaexpressedasapercentofGDP.
Gordon and King (1982) refined Okuns
empirical approach to deliver a more precise
estimate of the output cost of disinflation.
Using more complex econometric methods,
Gordon and King modeled the structure of the
economy as a system of equations that cap-
tures various factors affecting inflation and
output.AsinOkunsapproach,theyusedalin-
ear Phillips curve equation to link inflation and
output but found a sacrifice ratio that was less
than half of Okuns value. After four years, a
one-percentage-point decline in inflation was
associated with a cumulative 3.0 percent out-
put loss.
7
Okuns and Gordon and Kings assumption
of a linear Phillips curve, however, had an
importantpotentiallimitation.Linearityimplies
thattheoutputcostoffightinginflationdoesnot
vary with the strength of the economy or with
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Figure 1










{the aggressiveness of the fight. In contrast, a
nonlinearPhillipscurveallowstheoutputcostto
depend on these two factors.
Ball (1994) claimed that the limitations of
linearitywerepotentiallyempiricallyimportant.
He raised objections to the assumed linearity in
the postwar period, arguing that asymmetric
wage-price flexibility, credibility, and incomes
policies cause the sensitivity of inflation to out-
put to depend on whether output is above or
below trend. To avoid the assumption of linear-
ity, Ball estimated the sacrifice ratio using an
atheoretical approach rather than a Phillips
curve relationship. By directly measuring the
drop in output during disinflation periods, he
estimated a sacrifice ratio of 2.4smaller than,
butfairlycloseto,GordonandKingsestimate.
8
Using a similar approach, Jordan (1997) exam-
inedperiodsofrisinginflation.Heestimatedthe
change in output to be roughly 1.0 percent per
percentage point of higher inflation.
9 Taken
together, these two estimates are inconsistent
with the assumption of linearity.
Nonlinear Phillips curve and implications
Recent research on nonlinear Phillips curves
isflexibleenoughtocaptureoutputcoststhatare
cyclicallysensitiveyetpreciseenoughtouseina
structural model that incorporates the complex
interactions of the macroeconomy.
Possiblenonlinearshapes.Figure2illustrates
two possible nonlinear Phillips curves and
their implications for the cost of fighting
inflation.Bothcurvesshareanupwardslopethat
reflects the positive tradeoff between inflation
and the economys strength. In the figure, the
economysstrengthismeasuredbythedeviation
ofoutputfromitstrend,ortheoutputgap,and
inflation is measured relative to inflation
expectations. To deliberately disinflate, eco-
nomic policies must slow the economy. The
southwest quadrants in both panels of Figure 2
show that disinflation occurs when output is
below trend. In contrast, to prevent inflation
from rising, economic policies must preemp-
tively forestall output from rising above trend.
Thenortheastquadrantsshowthatinflationrises
when output is above trend.
10
BothnonlinearshapesofthePhillipscurvein
Figure 2 have intuitive and theoretical appeal.
ThetoppanelinFigure2showsaconcavePhillips




of inflation to the strength of the economy. The
flattening slope also means that a given change
in inflation requires an increasingly bigger
adjustment in output.
Theoretically,aconcavePhillipscurveiscon-
sistent with an economy where firms are not






changes than to a similar decrease in economic
activity.
11The reduced sensitivity of inflation as
the economy strengthens implies the shape of
the Phillips curve is concave.
AnotherpossibleshapeofthenonlinearPhillips
curve is convex. The bottom panel in Figure 2
showstheshapeofaconvexPhillipscurvewhich
graphically translates into an upward sloping
curve that steepens as output rises relative to
trend.Intuitively,thesteepeningslopeindicates
increased sensitivity of inflation to the econo-
mys strength. As the slope of the convex curve
steepens, inflation becomes more sensitive
because a given change in inflation requires a
progressively smaller output adjustment.
Theoretically, the convex Phillips curve is
consistent with an economy subject to capacity
constraints. In such an economy, inflation will


















Note: The output gap is defined as actual output less its trend.be increasingly sensitive to changes in output
as the economy strengthens. As the economy
becomes stronger and capacity constraints
increasinglyrestrictfirmsabilitytoexpandout-
put,anincreaseindemandismorelikelytoshow
up as higher inflation than as higher output. In
contrast, when the economy is weak and firms
face fewer capacity constraints, inflation is
likely to be less sensitive to output changes;
hence the convex shape of the Phillips curve.
Extant evidence of nonlinearity. Several
recent studies have begun to document impor-
tant nonlinearities in the Phillips curve. Early
work on G-7 countries by Turner (1995) and
Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1995) found evi-
dence of nonlinearity in several countries, includ-
ing the United States. These authors reported that
theslopeoftheU.S.Phillipscurvesteepensas
the economy strengthensa finding consistent
withaconvexcurve.Theseauthorsnoted,how-
ever,thatevidenceofnonlinearitydependscriti-
cally on the specification of the model and
careful measurement of the output gap.
12
Evidence of another form of nonlinearity has
also been found. Eisner (1997b) reported
results that are consistent with a concave Phil-
lipscurve.
13Hearguedthatinflationssensitivity
falls as the economy strengthens because, at
high levels of output and employment, effi-
ciencyenhancingeffortsholddownincreasesin
unit labor costs, thereby lessening inflationary
pressures. In addition, Stiglitz (1997), citing
unpublished research from the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, concluded that U.S. data pro-
videsomeevidenceofaconcavePhillipscurve.




the slopes of the concave and convex Phillips
curves vary systematically with the strength of
the economy, they imply that the output cost of
fighting inflation varies with the strength of the
economy. The concave Phillips curve implies
that the cost of fighting inflation rises with the
strengthoftheeconomybecauseastheeconomy
strengthens its slope flattens. In contrast, the con-
vex Phillips curve implies that the cost of fight-
ing inflation falls with the strength of the
economy because its slope steepens.
Recognizing such output cost differences
betweentheshapesisimportantforassessingthe
outputcostofdeliberatedisinflationandofpre-
emptively resisting rising inflation. The output




the Phillips curve when the economy is above
trend. A concave curve implies that a policy to
preemptively resist rising inflation of a given
size is more costly than a policy to deliberately
disinflate. In contrast, a convex Phillips curve
implies that a policy to deliberately disinflate
would be more costly than one to preemptively
resistasimilarriseininflation.Thenexttwosec-
tions discuss new estimates of the shape of the
curve and implications for policy.
II. NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON THE OUTPUT COST OF
FIGHTING INFLATION
This section presents new empirical evidence
ontheshapeofthePhillipscurveandtheoutput
cost of fighting inflation. The section first esti-
mates a Phillips curve using data through 1997
and allowing for nonlinearity. The particular
formofthenonlinearityisquiteflexibleandmay
helpexplaintheapparentlycontradictoryextant
evidence on the shape of the Phillips curve.
The estimated Phillips curve is then included
inasystemofequationsthatdescribesthemacro-
economy. The system is simulated to calculate
theoutputcostoffightinginflation.Tohelpsum-
marize the results, the section introduces a new
costmeasurecalledthecostoffightinginflation
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TRADITIONAL LINEAR PHILLIPS CURVE
This box describes the linear Phillips
curveanddrawsinferencesabouttheoutput
costoffightinginflation.ThePhillipscurve
traditionally has been assumed to be linear
for two key reasons. First, many analysts
have viewed the assumption of linearity as
empirically reasonable (Gordon 1997).
14
They have argued that linear models pro-
ducegoodout-of-sampleforecastsandpro-
vide a reasonable framework to analyze
policy issues. Second, linear models are
relatively easy to estimate and simulate,
thereby simplifying the calculation of the
cost of fighting inflation.
The key assumption behind the linear
Phillips curve is that inflation depends on
threekeyeconomicfactors:inflationexpec-
tations, resource utilization pressures, and
supplyshocks.Whilemanyalternativespeci-
fications of the curve have been proposed
since the pioneering work by A.W. Phillips
in 1958, the basic linear Phillips curve can
be described algebraically as follows:
ppb e tt
e
t trend t yy =+ - + () .
In this equation, inflation (p) is the per-
centagechangeintheaggregatepricelevel,
expected inflation (p




that have temporary effects on inflation,
such as oil shocks and exchange rate
changes. The coefficient b measures the
sensitivityofinflationtochangesintheout-
put gap.
In this framework, deliberate monetary
policy actions influence inflation in a fairly
limited and indirect way. An easing of
monetary policy boosts economic activity
relative to trend, while a tightening of
monetary policy has the opposite effect.
Becausebisapositivenumber,easiermone-
tary policy causes inflation to rise and
tighter monetary policy causes inflation to
fall. Overall, deliberate policy actions
largely affect inflation through the output
gapchannelintheshortrun.Inthelongrun,
monetary policy works primarily through
the expected inflation channel.
The output gaps relationship to inflation
canbesimplifiedbysettingsupplyshocksto
zero and abstracting from the determinants
of inflation expectations. This leads to a
Phillips curve equation that yields a rela-
tionship between unexpected inflation
changes and the output gap,
ppb tt
e
t trend yy =+ - () .
Thefigureinthisboxillustratesthislinear
Phillips curve. The upward slope of the
curvesignifiesthepositivetradeoffbetween
inflationandthestrengthofeconomicactiv-
ity. In the southwest quadrant, economic
activity is weak (output below trend) and
inflationtendstofall.Inthenortheastquad-
rant, economic activity is strong (output
above trend) and inflation tends to rise.
The Phillips curve determines the output
cost of fighting inflation in the southwest
quadrant of the figure. In this quadrant,40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
deliberate disinflation is associated with
weak economic activity. To deliberately
lower inflation, tight monetary policy must
lower output below trend. Assuming for
simplicity that all adjustments occur in one
period, the curve indicates that a one-
percentage-point reduction in inflation
would require output to fall 1/b percent
belowitstrend. Thus,theoutputcostorsac-
rifice ratio is 1/b.
Theoutputcostofdeliberatelypreventing
inflation from rising is more subtle than the
cost associated with a deliberate disinfla-
tion. The output cost of preventing an
increase in inflation is not a direct cost but
ratheranopportunitycost.Toseethis,imag-
ine an economy that is at its trend but has
considerable underlying strength. In the
absence of tighter monetary policy, eco-
nomic activity would surge above its trend,
thereby causing inflation to rise. A tighter
monetary policy could prevent the rise in
inflation if it forestalls the surge in output.
The cost of such a policy is the foregone
opportunityofhigheroutput(anditsrelated




1/b percent increase in economic activity
above trend is associated with a one-













cost associated with a deliberate disinflation
strategyaswellasastrategytopreventinflation-
ary pressures from causing inflation to rise.
Estimated shape of the nonlinear
Phillips curve
This section offers a more flexible Phillips
curve specification than in previous studies by
extending the specification by Clark, Laxton,
and Rose (1995).
15 The specification allows the
inflation-output relationship to differ across
threeratherthantworegimes.Thethreeregimes
correspond to economic periods when output is
well below trend (weak), near trend (balanced),
and well above trend (overheated).
Nonlinear specification. The nonlinear Phil-
lips curve captures the statistical relationships
among inflation, economic activity, inflation
expectations,andsupplyshocks.Algebraically,
the curve can be written as
pp tt
e =+ - bweak t gap during weak times *( ) 1
+ - bbalanced t gap during balanced times *( ) 1




e is inflation expectations, the gap is output
measured by real GDPless its trend, ande t is a
supply shock.
16 The slope coefficients on the
outputgap(, , ) bb b weak balanced overheated measurethe
sensitivity of inflation to economic activity in
theweak,balanced,oroverheatedregimes.Incon-
trast, a typical linear Phillips curve is regime inde-
pendent,implyingthatbb b weak balanced overheated ==.
Becausethereisnoofficialconventiontosplit
the data into the three regimes, the regime dates
are estimated using a threshold parameter a.
Essentially, a classifies economic activity into
threeregimes.Whenoutputismorethana percent
belowtrend,theregimeisconsideredweak.When
output is within a percent of trend, the regime is
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percentage-point rise in inflation. If mone-
tary policy can be tightened to prevent the
economy from overheating, the economy
wouldcontinuetogrowalongitstrend.With
the economy growing along its trend, infla-
tion does not rise. However, consumers,
workers, and investors would forego the
temporary benefits of output being 1/b per-
cent above trend.
To be sure, the relationships among infla-
tion, output, and monetary policy are not as
perfect and exploitable as these examples
might suggest. In the real world, there are
many factors that need to be considered
when determining short-run inflation
behavior. The factors include the speed of
adjustment of inflation expectations, the
size and persistence of supply shocks, and
the long and variable lags of monetary pol-
icy. To capture these factors in a figure
would be difficult and would obscure
insights from the Phillips curve into the
costs of fighting inflation. Empirical meth-
odsusedlaterinthisarticleaccountforthese
factors.
TRADITIONAL LINEAR PHILLIPS CURVE - continuedconsidered balanced. And when output is more
thana percent above trend, the regime is consid-




The specification in this article is sufficiently
flexible to allow various nonlinear Phillips
curve shapes. Figure 3 illustrates some possible
shapes implied by Equation 1. If the estimated
slopes, bi, decline steadily from the weak-
economy regime to the overheated-economy
regime, the Phillips curve is concave, as in the
top panel. In contrast, if the estimated slopes
steadily rise from the weak-economy regime to
theoverheated-economyregime,thenthecurve
is convex. In this figure, the curveswhich are
composed of linear line segmentscan be
thoughtofasapproximationstotheconcaveand
convex curves in Figure 2.
Unlike in previous research, the nonlinear
Phillips curve specification in Equation 1 also
allows shapes that are convex in one region and
concave in another region. Figure 4 illustrates
this possibility. In Figure 4, the slopes of the
Phillipscurvevaryacrossthethreeregimes,but
the slopes do not steadily increase or decrease.
Inflation in the weak-economy regime is more
sensitive to economic activity than in the
balanced-economy regime but is less sensitive
than in the overheated-economy regime. As a
result, when the output gap is less than a, the
kinkedcurveisconcave;whentheoutputgapis
greater than -a, the kinked curve is convex.
Estimated shape. The shape of the Phillips
curveisdeterminedbyestimatesoftheslopesand
thelengthoftheregionassociatedwiththebalanced
regime. The slopes (, , ) bb b weak balanced overheated
measuretheregime-dependentsensitivityofinfla-
tion to output; the larger the slope coefficient is,
thegreatertheinflationsensitivitywillbetothe
output gap. The size of the balanced regime is
determined bya.
Table 1 summarizes estimation results using
data from 1959 to 1997. Slope estimates of the
Phillipscurveinboldarestatisticallysignificant
at the 5-percent level. The first three columns




tion data that is explained by the explanatory
variables in the estimated equation.
The slope estimates in each of the three
regimes illustrate the nonlinear nature of the
estimated Phillips curve. In the weak-economy
regime, the slope is 0.20. In the balanced-
economy regime, the slope is essentially flat.
The slight negative coefficient estimate (-0.02)
suggests, counterintuitively, that inflation tends
tofallinthisregimewhentheeconomystrength-
ens;however,thecoefficientestimateisstatisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. A more
intuitive interpretation of this coefficient is that
there is not enough systematic evidence in the
balanced-economy regime to give a reliable
slope estimate.
17 In the overheated-economy
regime, the slope is 0.49, more than twice as




the Phillips curve depends on the size of the
weak, balanced, and overheated regimes. The
estimate $ . a=09impliesthesizeofthebalanced-
economy regime is fairly wide. The balanced-
economy regime occurs when output is roughly
a percentage point above or below trend; the
weak-economy regime occurs when output is
lessthanapercentagepointbelowtrend;andthe
overheated-regime occurs when output is more
than a percentage point above trend. By way of
comparison, in recessions output typically falls
from 2 to 4 percent below trend, and in excep-
tionallyrobustexpansionsoutputtypicallyrises
from 2 to 4 percent above trend.
18
The estimated nonlinear Phillips curve has a
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Figure 3
TWO POSSIBLE EMPIRICAL SHAPES OF NONLINEAR PHILLIPS CURVES








Piecewise concave Phillips curve
















Because it has both concave and convex
regions,theestimatedshapeofthethree-regime
Phillips curve helps reconcile the results of ear-
lier studies on the nonlinear Phillips curve
shape. Previous studies used a restrictive two-
regime specification that implied either a con-
vexoraconcavecurve,butnotacurvewithcon-
vexandconcaveregions.Giventheshapeofthe
estimated three-regime Phillips curve, it is not
surprisingthatsomeearlierstudiesbasedonthe
two regimes found evidence of convexity
(Clark, Laxton, and Rose 1995) and some other
studies found evidence of concavity (Stiglitz
1997,Eisner1997a).Theevidenceofconvexity
could have arisen in specifications that empha-
size inflation and output behavior in the bal-
anced and overheated regimes or the weak and
overheated regimes; the evidence of concavity
could have arisen in specifications that empha-




the average output loss associated with fighting
a given-sized inflation. In the case of disinfla-
tion, the COFI ratio is equivalent to the tradi-
tional sacrifice ratio. In the case of incipient
inflation pressures, the COFI ratio measures the
opportunity cost of forgone output associated
withpreemptivelyfightingthepressure.Inboth
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Figure 4











-= - a .9
a= .9cases, the estimated COFI ratio depends on the
shape of the Phillips curve. As might be
expected, COFI ratios based on the nonlinear
model are much more complicated to estimate
and describe than the COFI ratio based on the
linear model. A linear model produces a single
COFIratiothatisindependentoftheeconomys
strength and of the size of the disinflation or the
strength of the incipient inflation pressures
beingfought.Incontrast,nonlinearmodelspro-
duce COFI ratios that depend on these factors.
To account for these factors, this article simu-
lates a simple, yet conventional, model of the
macroeconomy that includes the estimated
regime-dependent Phillips curve. COFI ratios
aredirectlymeasuredbytheresponsesofoutput
and inflation to different simulated changes in
monetary policy.
19 Appendix Aoutlines techni-
caldetailsofthemodelandsimulations.Tosim-
plify the presentation of the simulation results,
the section first describes the COFI ratios for
simulationswheretheeconomydoesnotswitch
regimes, and then describes the COFI ratios for
more complicated, but more realistic simula-
tions, where the economy switches regimes.
Within-regime COFI ratios. The within-
regimeCOFIratioscanbethoughtofasthecost
of fighting inflation if the economy were to
remain in one regime and not switch to another.
Table 2 reports the regime-dependent COFI
ratiosassociatedwiththeresponseofoutputand
inflationtotightermonetarypolicy.Thefirstand
third columns show that the COFI ratios vary
systematically.Theoutputcostofdisinflationin
the weak regime (5.0 percent of GDP) is higher
than the cost of preemptively forestalling the
economy from operating in the overheated






cost of fighting inflation than in the overheated
regime.Thequantitativedifferencebetweenthe
estimated within-regime COFI ratios is plausi-
ble. The COFI ratio for the weak economy is
higher than Balls and King and Gordons esti-
mates but lower than Okuns for disinflations,
andtheratiofortheoverheatedregimeissome-
what higher than Jordans estimate.
Thesecondcolumninthetableindicatesadif-
ficulty in measuring the output cost associated
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Table 1
ESTIMATES OF NONLINEAR PHILLIPS CURVE: 1959-97
Sensitivity of inflation to the output gap
Three regimes
Dependent variable Weak economy Balanced economy Overheated economy
$ b weak $ b balanced $ b overheated R
2
CPI inflation .20 -.02 .49 .96
(3.98) (-.23) (5.95)
Notes: The estimates in bold indicate statistical significance at the 5-percent level. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Output gap is the deviation of real GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. The other parameters in the model are
$ .( .) , $ . pa 0 14 182 9 =- - = and$ .( .) . d=016 215 Atestofthehypothesisthat $$ bb weak overheated = isrejectedatthe5-percentlevel.A
linear specification of the Phillips curve yields coefficient estimates of $ .( .) , , p0 04 69 linear =- - $ .( .) , blinear = 18 707 and
$ .( .) . dlinear = 10 156with the balanced regime. If the economy stays
in the balanced regime and the slope were truly
zero,thewithin-regimeCOFIbalancedratiobydefi-
nition would approach infinity. Such a result is
inevitable because the COFI ratio measures the
output loss per percentage point of inflation
change.
21 Since the inflation change in the bal-
ancedregimeiszeroforanygivenchangeinout-
put, the ratio is infinity. It is more intuitive to
think about the flat portion of the Phillips curve
asindicatingthecostofinitiatingadisinflation.
For example, if the economy were growing
along its trend so that the output gap were zero,
output could fall a percent below trend and
remain up toa percent below trend indefinitely
without any change in the inflation rate. It takes
output losses greater thana percent to initiate a
disinflation.
22
The last column in Table 2 reports the COFI
ratio from a linear Phillips curve model. There
aretwokeydifferencesbetweenlinearandnon-
linear models. First, the single COFIlinear ratio
from the linear Phillips curve model does not
vary with the business cycle as does the within-
regime COFI ratios from the nonlinear model.
Second,theCOFIlinearratio(5.7percentofGDP)
isgreaterthanCOFIratiosinboththeweakand
overheated regimes. The difference reflects the
flatter slope of the linear Phillips curve than the
slopeofthenonlinearPhillipscurveintheweak
and overheated regimes.
Across-regime COFI ratios. Because most
inflation fighting strategies are likely to cause
theeconomytoswitchregimes,itisusefultocal-
culate across-regime COFI ratios. One particu-
larly interesting output cost calculation is one
associated with deliberate disinflation policies
initiatedwhentheeconomyisgrowingalongits
trend.Suchanoutputcostcalculation,however,
is quite complicated because of regime switch-
ing.Complicationsarisebecausetheoutputcost
dependsontheexactpathoftheeconomyandon
the number of regime switches as the economy
returns to its trend. Simulations can account for
these computational complications and provide
insightsintotheoutputcostoffightinginflation.
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Table 2
COFI RATIO ESTIMATES FOR THREE REGIMES
Output cost of fighting inflation within each regime
Nonlinear model  three regimes Linear model
Weak economy Balanced economy Overheated economy
COFIweak COFIbalanced COFIoverheated COFIlinear
5.0 * 2.1 5.7
* The slope of the Phillips curve in the balanced economy is essentially flat. If the point estimate were exactly zero, the
COFI ratio would be infinite because a small change in inflation is associated with a big change in real activity.
Notes: Each column reports the COFI ratio in each of the three regimes. COFIweak is equivalent to the more commonly




curve slope coefficient in each regime. The variance-covariance matrix was estimated using maximum likelihood
methods for the nonlinear system of equations described in Appendix A.Appendix B explains why the across-regime
COFI ratios are conceptually more complicated
than the within-regime COFI ratios.
SimulationsshowthatCOFIacross-regimeratiosfor
deliberate disinflations and preemptive fights
against incipient inflation pressures depend on
theinitialstrengthoftheeconomyandthesizeof
the potential inflation change. Table 3 reports
across-regimeCOFIratiosfromthesesimulations.
Reading across Table 3, the cost of fighting
inflation systematically varies with the initial
strengthoftheeconomy.Toillustratethispoint,
the table reports COFI ratios that correspond to
three different starting points for the economy.
Thebenchmarkcaseiswhentheeconomystarts
attrend(outputgapiszero).Onealternativecor-
responds to a relatively weak economy which
starts out -0.45 percent below trend (i.e., output
gapequals-a/2)andtoarelativelystrongecon-
omy starting 0.45 percent above trend.
In the case of disinflation, the output cost
increases as the initial strength of the economy
increases.A1-percentdisinflationcosts7.0per-
cent of output if initiated when the economy is
slightlybelowtrend(outputgap=-a/2),9.8per-
centwhentheeconomyisattrend(outputgap=
0), and 12.6 percent when the economy is





In contrast, the output cost of preemptively
fighting incipient inflation decreases as the ini-
tial strength of the economy increases. Table 3
indicates that preventing a one-percentage-
point increase in inflation costs 15 percent of
output when the economy is initially below
trend, 7.3 percent when the economy is initially
at trend, and 4.8 percent when the economy is
initially above trend. The simulation results
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Table 3
EXAMPLES OF ACROSS-REGIME COFI RATIOS
COFI ratios based on initial strength of business cycle and on size and type of inflation change
Average output cost of fighting inflation*
Initial strength of the economy (percent)
1
2a Below trend At trend 1
2a Above trend
Size of disinflation
1 percent 7.0 9.8 12.6
2 percent 5.6 7.0 8.1
Strength of incipient
inflation pressure
1 percent 15.0 7.3 4.8
2 percent 5.4 4.8 3.2
* The average cost is defined as the cost per percentage point of inflation reduction, or COFI ratio.
Notes:ThistableisbasedontheestimatednonlinearPhillipscurvesimilartoFigure4.WithsuchaPhillipscurve,thecost
of fighting inflation depends on the stage of the business cycle, the size of the disinflation, and the size of the potential
inflation change. The output gaps indicate the initial condition for the simulations. Output gaps ofa 20 ,, and
a 2represent three possible starting points in the balanced regime; the estimateda=09 ..
IfthePhillipscurveislinear,theaveragecostoffightinginflationisindependentofthestrengthoftheeconomyand
the size and type of inflation change. The COFIlinear is 5.7.reflect the sizes of the implicit economic forces
thatmonetarypolicymustoffsettoavertarisein
inflation. Intuitively, the strength of economic
forces associated with a weak economy must
exceedthoseassociatedwithastrongereconomy
if both would produce a given rise in inflation.
Moreover, the stronger the economic forces
that would propel the economy into the over-
heatedregime,thestrongerthepreemptivemone-
tary policy response must be to prevent rising
inflation; and thus, the larger will be the fore-
gone output.
Thesimulationsinthetable(readingdownthe
columns) also indicate that the cost of fighting
inflation decreases as the size of the desired
inflation change increases. In the case of disin-
flation, when the economy starts at trend, the
output cost per percentage point reduction in
inflation is 7.0 percent for a two-percentage-
point disinflation and 9.8 percent for a one-
percentage-pointdisinflation.Thus,thecostfor
eachpercentagepointreductionofinflationofa
two-percentage-point disinflation is lower than
for a one-percentage-point disinflation. In the
caseofapreemptivefightagainstincipientinfla-
tion,thesameresultapplies.Fightingapotential
two-percentage-point rise in inflation, on aver-
age, costs less per percentage point of incipient
inflation than a one-percentage-point rise.
In sum, Table 3 shows that the across-regime
COFI ratios are fairly complicated but help
describehowtheoutputcostoffightinginflation
changes with the economys strength, size of
potential inflation change, and type of anti-
inflation policy. Though more complicated, the
COFI ratios for the nonlinear model provide a
richer picture of the output cost than a standard
linear Phillips curve.
III.POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NEW EVIDENCE
The reported COFI ratios provide new evi-
dence on the output cost of fighting inflation.
Takenatfacevalue,theymayshednewlighton
how best to achieve and maintain low inflation.
In particular, the evidence has implications for
traditional views on the output cost of fighting
inflation,thetimingandspeedofdeliberatedis-
inflations, the benefits of preemptive monetary
policy,andthemeritsofmonetarypolicyexperi-
mentation.








omy is well below trend, the COFI ratio is 5.0,
and when the economy is well above trend, the
COFI ratio is 2.1. However, the linear model
produces a COFI ratio estimate of 5.7 for both
regimes. Thus, if the economy were in one of
these two regimes, the nonlinear models lower
cost of fighting inflation would suggest a more
aggressivestanceofpolicyagainstinflationthan
would be implied by a linear Phillips curve
model. Moreover, the COFI ratio for the bal-
anced regime is much greater for the nonlinear




ate stance of policy.
In addition, changes in regime complicate the
comparison of the nonlinear and linear models.
DespitetheresultthattheCOFIratiofortheweak
regimeis5.0,Table3showsthatwhenoutputstarts
at its trend (in equilibrium), a one-percentage-
point disinflation involves an output cost of 9.8
percentage points of output, but only 5.7 percent-
agepointsifthecurveislinear.Moreover,Table
3showsthattheCOFIratiosfromthenonlinear
model depend on the strength of the economy
andonthesizeofthepotentialinflationchange.
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higher costs of fighting inflation than the costs
implied by the linear model. In other cases, the
opposite is true. Thus, in terms of inflation
fighting policy, the nonlinear model will at
times imply a more aggressive fight against
inflation and at other times a less aggressive
fight than implied by the linear model. The les-
son for monetary policy is that the output cost
and stance of policy have to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.
Implications for timing of deliberate
disinflation
The flat portion of the Phillips curve also has
implications for the timing of deliberate disin-
flations. The linear Phillips curve indicates that
once output is below trend, inflation pressures
fall.Sinceitisgenerallythoughtthatthecostsof
disinflationnotdirectlyrelatedtooutputgrowas
the economy weakens (for example, economic
dislocations such as bankruptcies and unem-
ployment), the overall costs of deliberate disin-
flation might be minimized by keeping the
economy below, but near, trend.
The nonlinear curve offers a quite different
prescription. The flat portion of the curve indi-




has to operate well below its trend before any
benefits of disinflation can be achieved.
24
The nonlinear Phillips curve suggests two
relatively unpleasant options for the timing of
deliberate disinflation: a large tightening when
the economy is near (or above) trend or a small
tightening when the economy is weak. The
large, and possibly severe, tightening implies a
large output loss and raises the possibility of
uncontrollably sharp adjustments in economic
activity. In the past, severe tightenings have at
timesbeenassociatedwithrecessions.Thesmall
tightening, while more controllable, offers the
prospect of driving a weak economy even
weaker. Ultimately, the desirability of pursuing
eitheroptionhastobecomparedwithothercosts
related to weak economic activity and with the
benefits of disinflation.
25
Gradualism versus cold turkey
The output cost of disinflation may vary with








credibility plays an important role in determining
the costs of disinflation. A rapid disinflation




credibility dividend may not be available to
nations such as the United States. He argues
pragmatically that a monetary authority in a
low-inflation environment does not have the
opportunity to enhance its credibility with a
large, rapid disinflation. Without the possibility
of such a disinflation, the shape of the Phillips
curvelargelydeterminestheoutputcostofdisin-
flation. King notes that gradualism is the low-
coststrategyifthePhillipscurveisconvex.Ifthe
Phillips curve is concave, cold turkey is the
low-cost strategy.
Because the estimated Phillips curve in this
article is concave when output is below trend,
the cold turkey strategy is the low-cost strategy
for a deliberate disinflation. Table 3 corrobo-
rates the cost advantage of the cold turkey
approach. The table shows that the average cost
of a two-percentage-point disinflation is gener-
ally less costly per percentage point of disinfla-
tion than a one-percentage-point disinflation.
27
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The estimated nonlinear Phillips curve in this
articleillustratesthebenefitofpreemptivepoli-
cies. If the economy were to temporarily grow
well above its trend, output would be temporar-
ily high but inflation would rise. Deliberately
disinflating to lower the inflation rate to its pre-
viousratewouldthenrequireatemporaryreduc-
tionofoutputbelowtrend.Infact,theestimated
shape of the nonlinear Phillips curve indicates
that the reduction in output would have to more
thanoffsetthetemporaryriseinoutputtoreturn
inflation to its previous rate. Thus, there is an
output cost of permitting inflation to drift
upward.
Policymakersmaybeabletoavoidsuchcosts
if they are able to foster conditions that would
keep the economy balanced.
28 Policies that fos-
ter balanced growth along the economys trend
are most likely to maintain stable inflation and
eliminate the need to engage in costly inflation
fighting. However, fostering conditions for
near-trend growth is easier said than done. It is
generally accepted that monetary policy affects
the economy with long and variable lags. Thus,
preemptivepoliciesareneededtorespondtothe
early signs of rising inflationary pressures. Of
course, the effectiveness of these policies
depends on the accuracy with which incipient
inflationary pressures are measured.
Policy experimentation
Theissueofpolicyexperimentationhastaken
on special importance recently. Some econo-
mistshavearguedthattheeconomyinthe1990s
experienced a structural change which has
altered the traditional relationship between out-
putandinflation.Inparticular,thelaborproduc-
tivitytrendhasperhapsbecomesteeperbecause
of increased investment in computers, strong
business fixed investment, and widespread
downsizing (Filardo 1995). If the productivity
trend were stronger, the Federal Reserve could
accommodate output above its historical trend
without sparking inflation. Since the structural
change is not known with certainty, this policy
would be somewhat speculative.
Stiglitz (1997) raises the possibility that such
policy experimentation can enhance economic
welfare.Ontheonehand,byavoidingpreemp-
tive policies that deliberately seek to slow out-
put toward its historical trend, the Federal
Reservecouldmakepeoplebetteroffbyallow-
ingtheaveragelevelofoutputtoexceeditshis-
torical trend. If a structural change had
occurred, average output would rise and infla-
tion would remain subdued. If there had not
been structural change, average output may
still rise without a permanent increase in the
inflation rate.
Theeffectoftheaccommodativepolicyonthe
average level of output depends on the shape of
the Phillips curve. If the Phillips curve is con-
cave,theincreaseinoutputthatgenerateshigher
inflation would be greater than the subsequent
declineinoutputthatwouldreturninflationtoits
previous rate. As a result, the average level of
outputwouldrise.IfthePhillipscurveisconvex,
however, this fortuitous relationship does not
exist. In this case, to return inflation to its pre-
vious level, the initial rise in output would be
smaller than the subsequent decline in output.
Thus, to deliver output benefits, the Phillips
curve must be concave.
On the other hand, such policy experimenta-
tion can also reduce economic welfare by
increasing uncertainty about short-run inflation
becausethestructuralchangeisnotknownwith
certainty. Overall, the net benefit of policy
experimentation depends, as Stiglitz points out,
on the Phillips curve being sufficiently concave
to more than offset the costs of the increased
inflation risk.
While Stiglitzs argument is theoretically
sound, its practical importance rests on empiri-
50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYcal evidence of concavity. At the time, Stiglitz
noted that the evidence supporting concavity
wassimplymildandsuggestive.Thisledhim
to conclude tentatively that even risk-averse
policymakers may want to engage in moderate
experiments.
29 However, does Stiglitzs con-
clusionstillholdwhenonlyaportionofthePhil-
lips curve is concave as reported in this article?
Ingeneral,theanswerisno.Stiglitzsconclusion
depends on the Phillips curve being concave
when the economy is above trend. The esti-
matedshapeofthePhillipscurveinthisarticle
exhibitsconvexitywhentheeconomyisabove
trend and concavity only when the economy is
operating below trend. Thus, the evidence pre-
sented in this article suggests that experimenta-
tion is undesirable.
In summary, the new evidence on the cost of
fighting inflation has several implications for
monetarypolicy.Policiesshouldbemoreproac-
tivethanthoseimpliedbythetraditionalmodels,
but the more proactive policies should not
include policy experimentation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accurately assessing the output cost of fight-
inginflationplaysanimportantroleindetermin-
ing the appropriate policy to achieve and
ultimately maintain price stability. The esti-
mated Phillips curve in this article offers a new
perspective on the output cost. The estimated
shape of the curve suggests that inflation and
output are related in a complicated, nonlinear
way. In particular, the curve is found to be con-
cavewhentheeconomyisoperatingbelowtrend
and convex when above trend.
Such a shape implies that the output cost of
fighting inflation is more complex than previ-
ously thought. The output cost is found to
dependcriticallyonthestrengthoftheeconomy,
the size of the inflation change, and whether
policymakersseektodisinflateorpreventinfla-
tion from rising. This new evidence may help
policymakers assess more precisely the output
cost of fighting inflation than in the past. When
devisingfuturestrategies,however,policymak-
ersmuststillweighthisnewevidenceagainstthe
other costs and benefits of fighting inflation.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 5152 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX A
MODEL DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION
This appendix describes the multivariate
system of equations, model estimation, and
simulation methods used to calculate the
COFI ratios.
Nonlinear system of equations
A six-equation-system derivative of that
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1994) is used to describe macroeconomic
activity.Thedependentvariablesofthesys-
tem are the contemporaneous values of real
GDPrelativetotrend,inflation,commodity
prices,inflationaryexpectations,thefederal
funds rate, and the ratio of nonborrowed
reserves to total reserves. The explanatory
variables for all these equations (except for
the inflation equation) include the lags of
thesevariables.Thekeydifferencebetween
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evanss sys-
tem (CEE) and the system in this article is
that the articles inflation equation is speci-
fied to be the nonlinear Phillips curve rela-
tionship used in the second section.
30
The article assumes that inflation is a
piecewise linear function of the output gap,
and that expectations slowly adjust. In par-
ticular, inflation expectations are assumed
to have the following form:




t =+ + - -- - 01 11 () .
The inflation expectation specification
has an intuitive interpretation. Thep 0 term
is a constant inflation premium, reflecting
theaverageempiricaldeviationofsurveyinfla-
tion expectations from actual inflation.
31
Some theories predict that survey inflation
expectations may be biased measures of
inflationifthepublicisskepticaloftheFederal




t -- - +- 11 1 () term captures the
empirical observation that changes in infla-
tion are sluggish. Expectations sluggishly
adjust to a new equilibrium inflation rate
becausep
e depends on last periods inflation
rate and the realized error in last periods
expectation from the actual inflation rate.
Substituting this expectation formation
equation into the general nonlinear Phillips
curve relationship and rearranging terms
yield the following three-regime Phillips
curve:
pt- - pt 1=p 0 +d(' last period sinflation forecast error)
+bneg neg lagged outputgap I () ´
+bbalanced lagged outputgap ()
+´ + be pos pos t lagged outputgap I ()
=p0 +- -- dp p () t
e
t 11
+ - bweak t gap weak times () 1
+ - bbalanced t gap balanced times () 1
+ - boverheated t gap overheated times () 1
+e t
where gap weak times t () -1
=£ - -- gap if gap tt 11 , a
otherwise= 0
gap balanced times t () -1
=- < £ -- gap if gap tt 11 , aa
otherwise= 0
gap overheated times t () -1
=> -- gap if gap tt 11 ,, a
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In this equation, the indicator functions
I neg andI pos takeonavalueof1iftheoutput
gap data come from the regime associated
with the weak and overheated regimes,
respectively.
33 Otherwise the indicator
functionsarezero.Econometrically,theuse
of the indicator functions forces the three
linesegmentstobejoinedatcommonknot-
point(ratherthanbeingdisjointed).The
difference between the actual regression
equationandtheformoftheequationinthe
second section is a minor redefinition.
The coefficient estimates for each
regimearedefinedasbb b weak neg balanced =+
andbb b overheated pos balanced ++ .
34
Nonlinear system estimation, impulse
responses, and calculating COFI ratios
The estimation strategy is also somewhat
moreinvolvedthantheusualVARstructure
ofCEE.Thismodelisanonlinearsystemof
equations which requires more than
equation-by-equation ordinary least square
methods. The parameters of the system of
equationsarejointlyestimatedwithnonlin-
ear least squares. Despite the nonlinearity
estimation of the parameters, the model in
each regime is essentially linear in the
explanatory variables. Thus, the impulse
responsesforeachregimearegeneratedina
manner similar to a standard VAR. In addi-
tion,innovationsinthissystemareassumed
to be recursive (allowing the Choleski
decomposition of the estimated variance-
covariance matrix to be used).
The COFI ratios are measures of the out-
put cost of fighting inflation. In this model,
inflation will be affected by innovations in
any of the equations. Of particular interest
are changes in the inflation rate caused by
innovationstothefederalfundsrateequation.
As is standard in the CEE-type model of
monetary policy, innovations to the federal
fundsrateequationaretakenasmeasuresof
the change in monetary policy. Positive inno-
vations are thought to represent unexpectedly
tighter monetary policy and negative
innovations represent unexpectedly easier
policy.
35
In this framework, the COFI ratios are
measuredasaratiooftheresponseofoutput
relative to the response of inflation follow-
inganinnovationtothefederalfundsrate.
36
Following Gordon and King (1982) and
Cecchetti(1994),theratioisdefinedrelative
tothefollowingmovingaveragerepresenta-
tions of the estimation model:
yA L tt = () n
where AL a L ij ij
j
j
J () , ,, =
= å 1 for
i gap com ff m
e ={, ,, , , } pp . This equation
provides enough structure to calculate the
COFIratioineachregime.Thereareseveral
stepsinthecalculation.First,thecumula-
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ratio can then be calculated as

























These measures of the cost of fighting
inflation are somewhat more complicated
than in the traditional structural model
becauseoftheregimedependence.Thisarti-
cletakesatwo-stepapproachtocharacterize
the basic results. First, COFI ratios for each
regime are calculated assuming the econ-
omy remains in the regime that it starts in.
Table 2 reports the within-regime COFI
ratios.Second,COFIratiosforpolicysimu-
lations are reported for monetary policy
shocks that cause the economy to switch
regimes. The two types of simulations help
provideinsightsintohowtheoutputcostcan
vary with the business cycle and with the
type of inflation fighting strategy.
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APPENDIX B
COST COMPONENTS OF THE ACROSS-REGIME COFI RATIO
ThenonlinearPhillipscurvesuggeststhat
the total cost of fighting inflation can be
thoughtofasincludingfixed,marginal,and
transitionalcosts.Tosimplifythediscussion
in this appendix, the case of disinflation is
highlighted. The arguments also apply to
the case of fighting incipient inflation.
A simple framework
Thefixedcostcorrespondstotheflatpor-
tion of the estimated Phillips curve and can
be thought of as the cost the economy must
payeachperiodtoinitiateadisinflation.Itis
independent of the size of the disinflation
sought.
The marginal cost of a disinflation corre-
sponds to the slope of the Phillips curve in
theweakregime.Oncethefixedcostispaid,
any additional output loss in a period is a
marginal cost because there is an inflation-
output tradeoff. The marginal cost of disin-
flation is within-regime COFIweak.
Finally, the transitional cost corresponds
tooutputlossesthatdonotgenerateinflation
reductions. Such costs are incurred as the
economyreturnstotrendandpassesthrough
the balanced regime. When in this regime,
theeconomyexperiencesoutputlossesthat
do not generate changes in inflation. In the-
ory, an inflation fighting strategy would try
to eliminate these costs. In practice, these
costsareimpossibletoeliminateandcanbe
large. These costs arise because monetary
policyisnotapreciseinstrument.Monetary
policy can alter output conditions to lower
inflationbutcannotperfectlycontroloutput
adjustments. Inotherwords,monetarypol-
icy cannot engineer a disinflation with an
exact one-period output adjustment.
In sum, the three key cost components
associated with across-regime COFI ratios
can be described in the simple equation at
the bottom of the page.
The main difference between the across-
regimeratiosandthewithin-regimeratiosis
that the across-regime ratios include both
the fixed and transitional costs. If the fixed
and transition costs are zero, the COFIacross-
regime = COFIwithin-regime.
An example
To illustrate the various costs, suppose
monetarypolicyistightenedtodeliberately
disinflate. Suppose also that the economy
isinitiallygrowingalongitstrendtheout-
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economy is denoted by (0) in Figure B1.
Assumeforsimplicitythatthetighterpolicy
causes output to deviate from trend for
three periods. In the first period, the tighter
monetarypolicycausesoutputtofall1.9per-
cent below trend, denoted by the (1) in the
figure. The1.9percentoutputlossisattrib-
uted to two component costs: 0.9 percent is
fixedcostand1percentismarginalcost.At
this level of the output gap, the Phillips
curveindicatesthatinflationwillfallby0.2
percentage point. In the second period, out-
put is 0.5 percent below trend. Because the
output loss is not associated with a further
drop in inflation, the 0.5 percent output gap
isatransitionoutputcost. Inthethirdperiod,
output returns to trend. In sum, the cost of
fighting inflation ratio is
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Figure B1







Notes: The slopes of the nonlinear Phillips curve are estimated to bebb weak balanced == - ., ., 22 andboverheated = 04 9 .. The
within-regime COFI ratio associated withbweakis 5. The kink points occur at-= - a .9anda=.9.ENDNOTES
1Eventhoughsomeeconomistsandpolicymakersbelieve
thatinflationiscurrentlysufficientlyclosetopricestability,
conventional indicators of inflation such as the CPI
(adjusted for measurement biases) are above zero.
2 To assess the desirability of disinflation, the costs of
disinflation have to be weighed against the benefits of
lowerinflation.Thebenefitsmaybeparticularlyfavorable
because the temporary output losses are offset by the
benefitsofthepermanentlylowerinflationrate.SeeNeely




to the output cost, disinflation may also cause other costs
thataremissedbymeasuringthecostsbyoutputalone.For
example,largedisinflationsareassociatedwithrecessions.
Recessions not only lower output but also lead to other
difficult-to-measure intangible costs related to such
developmentsaslostjobs,failedbusinesses,greatersocial
unrest, higher crime, and a widening of the income
distribution.Inasense,thesacrificeratiodoesnottakeinto
accounttheeconomicwelfarecostsofthoseinsocietywho
are making the sacrifice.
4Okuncertainlywasnotthefirsteconomisttoconsiderthe
costs of disinflation. Predecessors include Milton
FriedmanandFriedrichHayek.SeeBall(1994)forashort
overview of more recent history of the sacrifice ratio, and
Friedman’s (1994) comment on Ball’s research for further
historical antecedents.
5 Okun actually reported a wide range of sacrifice ratios
correspondingtotherangeofestimatesofthePhillipscurve
slopeintheliterature.Theestimateof10reportedinthetext
has a range of 6 to 18. Note the range is not a conventional
standard error of the estimate.
6 For example, the cumulative output loss (measured as
deviation of actual output from trend) in the early 1990s




different identification restrictions and their effects on
sacrifice ratio measures. Another small-scale modeling
methodthatmayofferadifferentperspectiveonmeasuring





for example, Bonfim and Rudebusch (1997), and Bonfim,
Tetlow, von zur Muehlen, and Williams (1997). These
modelsgeneratesacrificeratiosintherangeof1to3under
different assumptions about credibility and expectation
formation.
8 Ball (1994) outlines a procedure in his paper to estimate
thetrendsininflationandoutput.Withthesetrendsandthe
starting points and ending points of disinflationary
episodes, he can directly calculate sacrifice ratios. Ball
findsthattheaveragesacrificeratioacrossmanycountries
hasarangeof.75to2.92whenusingquarterlydata.Using
annual data, the measures are somewhat smaller. The
smaller estimates may be due to measurement error
because the annual data smooth the quarterly peaks and
troughs. Andersen uses a slightly different variant on the
atheoretical approach and reports cross-country sacrifice
ratios mainly between .25 and 2.25. See Cecchetti (1994),




inflation. In periods of rising inflation, output is typically
abovetrend,indicatingatemporaryoutputgain,notaloss.
Thus, the term sacrifice ratio is a misnomer. In contrast,
Jordan’s output measure is called a benefice ratio.
The cost of fighting incipient inflation is closely related
tothenotionofthebeneficeratio.Abeneficeratiomeasures
the temporary output gain above trend associated with
higher inflation. Thus, it is related to the slope of the





related to the benefice ratio because both are linked to the
shapeofthePhillipscurvewhenoutputisabovetrend.The
costoffightingincipientinflationisequaltothenegativeof






trend. Thus, it is a theoretical possibility that if inflation
expectationswerefallingrapidly,inflationcouldfallwhen
output exceeds trend. However, because expectations are
assumed to adjust sluggishly, inflation will rise generally
when output is above trend.
11 Firms that exhibit this pricing power are referred to as
monopolistic competitors. Another theoretical
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 57justificationfortheconvexshapeiswagerigidity.Ifwages
are downwardly rigid and aggregate demand falls, firms
will have to adjust employment (and therefore output)
rather than wages to lower costs. Wage rigidity causes the
slope of the Phillips curve to flatten as output rises above
trend. See Dupasquier and Ricketts (1997a & b) for a
catalogofPhillipscurvenonlinearitiesandforadiscussion
of specification and testing issues.
12 Turner (1995) and Clark, Laxton, and Rose (1995)
sparked a series of studies into the robustness of the
findings as well as refinements of the estimation model.
Laxton, Meredith, and Rose (1995), Clark and Laxton
(1997), Debelle and Laxton (1996), Duspasquier and
Ricketts (1997a & b), and Laxton, Rose, and Tambakis
(1997) use similar nonlinear Phillips curve specifications.
Intheirspecifications,inflationsensitivitytotheoutputgap
varieswiththestateoftheeconomyinaparticularway.The
sensitivity does not continuously vary with the state of the
economy but depends on whether the economy is in a






in the output gap. The exact functional form is discussed
later in the article.
All these studies corroborate evidence of nonlinearity.
Using nonparametric rank correlation tests, Duspasquier
and Ricketts find weak evidence of nonlinearity. Using
standard F-tests, Turner rejects linearity in the U.S. data at
the 1 percent significance level. And the other authors
generally find robust statistical significance of parameters
that capture nonlinearity.
13 Eisner (1997a & b) uses the unemployment rate as his
measure of real activity. Using Okun’s law relating
unemployment and output, Eisner’s results can be
translated into implications for inflation and output. The
translation is not likely to change the conclusions of
concavity. Debelle and Laxton (1997) use unemployment
rates to define the Phillips curve and find evidence of
convexity.Theevidenceofnonlinearitydependsoncareful
measurement of the natural rate of unemployment.
14Gordon(1997,p.26)states,“Noneofthesedifferencesis
statistically significant, indicating that the short-run
Phillips curve is resolutely linear, at least within the range
of inflation and unemployment values observed over the
1955-1996 period.”
15 Clark, Laxton, and Rose (1995) proposed a simple
asymmetric model of the Phillips curve. Their
inflation equation is a function of inflationary
expectations, the output gap, and lagged inflation:
pd p d p b t
e






*= yt -ytrend +l.Inflationaryexpectationsaremeasured
as the five-quarter average of the four-quarter-ahead
expectation of inflation from the University of Michigan
survey; the output trend is measured by a 12-quarter
centered-moving average of actual output.
The key features of the model are the use of the positive
values of the normalized output gap, and the definition of
the normalized output gap to include a lterm. They point
outthattheevidenceofnonlinearityismuchweakerinthe
two-regimemodelwithouttheadjustment.Theyarguethat
in models where inflationary expectations are unbiased
estimatesofactualinflation,lnaturallyarisestoguarantee
bounded inflation when the model is subject to stochastic
demand. Note that the specification in this article does not
rely on their controversial adjustment to find nonlinearity.
However, a constant is included in the Phillips curve
equation that is discussed in Appendix A.
16 Inflation is measured by the consumer price index with
the adjustment for rental equivalent corrections in the
pre-1983 period (CPI-U-X1). Inflation expectations are
estimated to be a function of the quarterly average of the
UniversityofMichigansurvey’s12-monthmeanexpected
change in prices; details are given in Appendix A. The
outputgapiscalculatedasthedifferencebetweenlogGDP
and its Hodrick-Prescott trend with a standard smoothing
parameter of 1,600.
17 In specifications with the core consumer price index
inflation (without food and energy prices) and PCE
inflation, the slope coefficient for the balanced regime is
negative but statistically insignificant at the 10 percent
level.Thissuggeststhattheinflation-outputtradeoffmodel
in this article is too simple to adequately provide guidance
about inflation when the economy is near its trend.
18 In 1997:Q4, the estimated output gap was .9.
19ThenonlinearPhillipscurvecomplicatesthecalculation
ofthecostoffightinginflationbecausethecostsdependon
the particular path of the economy. Since there are myriad
ways that monetary policy can be designed to fight
inflation, no simple measure can be developed.
Technically, the costs are calculated from nonlinear
impulse responses that are path dependent. This article
summarizes some of the qualitative features of the results
with examples.
20Thewithin-regimeCOFIratiosaresimplytheinverseof
the Phillips curve slope estimate, 1bi, where the index i
corresponds to the weak, balanced, and overheated
regimes. However, the simple relationship between the
slopeofthePhillipscurveineachregimeandtheCOFIratio
breaks down when the economy switches regimes.
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andasmalldisinflationofsizep
- wassoughtinoneperiod,









22 The flat portion of the estimated Phillips curve can also





disinflationary or inflationary episodes. For example,
commodity prices may fall because of discoveries of new
supplies. The resulting disinflation may therefore be
independent of whether the economy is above or below
trend. However, if the output gap is sufficiently large or
small, the output gap largely dominates other factors that
determine the inflation rate.
23Anotherwaytointerpretthisresultistofocusonthetwo
componentsoftheoutputcost.Theoutputcostcomponent
associated with the weak regime is the same for both
starting points. However, the output cost component
associated with initiating a disinflation differs. If output is
initially at or above trend, policy must significantly slow
theeconomyinordertoinitiateadisinflation.Incontrast,if
theeconomyisoperatingbelowtrendbutabove-a,policy
needs to slow the economy by a smaller amount, thus
making the output cost due to policy smaller in this case.
24 In other words, the flat portion of the nonlinear Phillips
curve indicates that subpar economic activity (sometimes
associated with what economists call a growth recesssion)
would not necessarily cause a disinflation.
25 Moreover, even if both options are proven to be
undesirable, that does not mean that no progress toward
pricestabilitywilleverbemadebytheeconomyoperating
below trend. There is always the chance that a significant
andunexpectedreductioninaggregatedemand—suchasa
recession—wouldslowtheeconomysufficientlytoreduce
inflation. Such developments entail an output cost but one
usually unavoidable by monetary policy; Blinder (1997),
for example, has commented in the past that “the United
States is ‘one recession away’ from price stability.” Note
that this discussion ignores the regime design issues of
Orphanides and Wilcox (1996).
26 In contrast, Gordon (1982) examines how inflation
responds to nominal spending changes. He looks at 14
international historical episodes and concludes that the
benefits of cold turkey may be small.
27Toillustratethisfindingwiththeframeworkoutlinedin
Appendix B, consider the following two strategies to




the economy is initially growing at trend and that the
adjustments all occur in one period, the cost of the first
strategy is a +5 . 0x2=10.9 percentage points of output
(ignoring transitional costs for simplicity). The cost of the
two-period strategy is (a +5 . 0 )+( a +5 . 0 )=2 a + 10.0 =
11.8 percentage points of output. With a large disinflation,
thefixedcost(perperiod)ofdisinflationis“paid”forfewer
periodsthanifthedisinflationisgradual.Themarginalcost
for each strategy is the same. Thus, in general, more rapid
disinflation is less costly. The lower output cost of rapid
disinflationindicatesthatthecoldturkeystrategyisalower
output cost strategy than gradualism.
28Giventheoutputcostadvantageofkeepingtheeconomy
well balanced, is there a cost advantage to being close to a
zerooutputgap?Ifthecurveisflat,theanswerisno.Ifflat,a
small positive output gap would be beneficial without an
apparent cost in terms of inflation. Even though the point
estimates are consistent with a flat slope, they are also
consistent with a slightly increasing slope. If the slope is
somewhat upward sloping, then there are benefits of
fosteringconditionsconduciveforbalancedoutputgrowth
centered around a zero output gap.
29 It should be noted that if policymakers think that the
Phillipscurveislinear,thenthecostsofthehigherinflation
are the same as the costs of disinflation to wring the
inflationoutofthesystem.Thus,arisk-aversepolicymaker
would shun the experimentation.
30 Thedatesfrom1959to1997oftheweak,balanced,and
overheated economic periods of at least two quarters are:
weak-economy regime, 1960:Q4-1961:Q3, 1962:
Q4-1963:Q2, 1970:Q1-1972:Q1, 1974:Q4-1977:Q1,
1982:Q1-1983:Q3, 1991:Q1-1992:Q2; balanced-economy
regime, 1960:Q2-1960:Q3, 1964: Q1-1964:Q3,
1965:Q1-1965:Q3, 1967:Q2-1968:Q1, 1969:Q3-1969:Q4,
1972:Q2-1972:Q3, 1977:Q4-1978: Q1, 1983:Q4-1984:Q1,
1986:Q2-1988:Q3, 1990: Q3-1990:Q4, 1992:Q3-1997:Q3;
overheated-economy regime, 1959:Q2-1960:Q1, 1965:
Q4-1967:Q1, 1968:Q2-1969:Q3, 1972:Q4-1974:Q2,
1978:Q2-1980:Q1, 1984:Q2-1984:Q3, 1988:4-1990:2.
31 In the nonlinear Phillips curve estimation, the p0
parameterisstatisticallysignificant.Theestimateindicates
that when the output gap is zero, inflationary expectations
tend to be higher than the actual inflation rate.
32 In textbook Phillips curve models, p0 would be
constrained to be zero. This would reflect the economic
intuitionthatwhentheeconomyisinitssteadystatewitha
zero output gap, the inflation rate should be steady. This
empirical model allows the possibility that when the real
economy is in equilibrium, inflationary expectations may
not necessarily be set to the steady rate. This parameter is
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1998 59assumed to measure the inflation premium and can be
explained in a standard political economy model of
monetarypolicy. Theinflationpremiumcanbethoughtof
as a function of the credibility of the monetary authority.
BarroandGordon(1983)andmanyothershavearguedthat
monetary policy in the postwar period has been subject to
thistimeinconsistency. Theypointoutthataninflationbias
arises naturally because well-intentioned monetary
authorities may be predisposed to exploit the
inflation-output tradeoff. McCallum (1995), however,
raises doubts about the arguments supporting the inflation
bias hypothesis.




coefficients, this article did not pursue a more elaborate
specification of supply shocks.
34 The model is estimated using a slightly modified
nonlinearleastsquares(NLS)routine.Allparametersinthe
modelexcepta areestimatedwithstandardNLSmethods.
Because of data discreteness, the parameter a is estimated
by searching over a grid (similar to threshold
autoregressiveestimation)tosolvethefollowingproblem:
a g(; a otherparameters)subjecttothesideconstraint
thattheslopecoefficientsarenotstatisticallynegative.The
g function is the sum of squared errors. Standard errors of
the a parameter are difficult to calculate. Various starting
values in the parameter space were used to verify the
robustness of the results.
35 The interpretation of the federal funds rate innovations
as monetary policy shocks is somewhat standard. See, for
example, the research of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans(1994)andLeeper,Sims,andZha(1996).Thisview,
however, is not without its critics. See Rudebusch (1996)
for a critique of the monetary policy interpretation.
36Theshocksusedinthesimulationaretheorthogonalized
innovations from a Choleski decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrices. The ordering of the
decomposition is: GDP, inflation, commodity prices,
inflation expectations, federal funds rate, and ratio of
nonborrowed reserves to total reserves.
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